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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The beginning of a sustained effort to Monitor the distri-
bution of services at the local level can be traced to the events and 
political realities of the 1960s. Although there were earlier 
atteMpts to analyze public administration and review the success of 
certain welfare programs, those initiatives were sporadic and 
uncoordinated.1 However, in the 1960s, community action groups 
and the Civil Rights movement focused attention on pressing urban 
problems and apparent inequities in the delivery of basic services. 
The Kerner Commission disclosed that "one principal cause of the 
racial disorders of the 1960s was dissatisfaction with municipal 
2 governments and their outputs.'' But as the process of suburba-
nization continued, the capacity of central cities to raise the 
revenue neccessary to finance redistributive and renewal 
policies declined. In addition, the multiplication of special 
districts established to administer particular services may have 
actually impeded the effort to insure uniform standards of equality 
in the distribution of services. Major policy-making officials 
in urban areas, operating within a fiscally strained and fragmented 
1see G. Lyons, Tbe Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and 
the Federal Government (New York: Russell Sage Foundations, 1969). 
2Robert L. Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 13. 
1 
2 
governmental system, were confronted with rising demands for 
efficient and equitable allocations of services. Coincidentally, 
a body of research developed that was exclusively concerned with the 
provision of municipal services.3 
While past studies of political participation tended to focus 
on voting behavior, an increasing number of political scientists 
recognized the theoretical importance of the relationship between the 
outcome of service distribution policies and political participation. 
Accordingly, studies of service distribution were typically advanced 
in the following terms: 
A singular focus on the electoral process and the variety of 
interest groups and their access to decision-makers ••• is 
unquestionably important ••• but neglects another element of 
politics which is implicit in much that is written about 
political participation. This neglected element is the 
manner in which individuals enjoy the fruits of participation 
or apathy; it concerns the4degree to which people obtain valued goods and services. 
One can reasonably suggest that, for the majority of citizens, 
political involvement is related to the efficiency with which 
governmental systems deliver services, with participation in politics 
a function of perceptions of equity and efficiency in the admini-
stration of services. 
Similarly, service distribution research is often linked to 
3see Donald M. Fisk and Richard E. Winnie, "Output 
Measurement in Urban Government: Current Status and Likely 
Prospects," Social Science Quarterly .54 (1973/74): 725-740. 
~erbert Jacob, "Contact With Government Agencies: A Preli-
minary Analysis of the Distribution of Government Services," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science V16 (1972), p. 123. 
Laswell's definition of the science of politics as the discovery 
of "who gets what, when and how."5 As Rich states: 
3 
••• the discussion which follows is predicated on the assumption 
that public services are the prizes of urban politics. The game 
is not played only to determine who will get available services, 
but also to determine which services will be provided, what units 
of government will provide them, and who will bear their costs.6 
Levy, Hel tsner and Wildavsky suggest that both scholars and citizens 
are intent on discovering the rationale of distributive policy: (for 
example) "the Park Department favors the poor, or it discriminates 
against black neighborhoods, or it spends too much money for what it 
produces." 7 1 
Others treat services as policy outputs indicative of an 
"authoritative allocation of values." For those concE'rned with 
political behavior and the policy process, service distribution is 
an especially salient topic. "The city is seen as a service dependent 
environment, whose viability as a social unit directly depends on the 
continuous provision of services."8 In view of Easton's systems model 
of the policy process, patterns of service distribution will reflect 
the relationship between the demands of recipient groups and the 
-1rarold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What. When and How 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936). 
6Richard C. Rich, "Neglected Issues in the Study of Urban Ser-
vice Distributions: A Research Agenda," Urban Studies 16 {1979): 143. 
7Frank Levy, Arnold J. Meltsner and Aaron Wildavsky, Urban_ 
Outcomes (Berkely: University of California Press, 1974), p. 1. 
~obert L. Lineberry and Robert E. Welch Jr., "Who Gets What: 
Measuring the Distribution of Urban Public Services," Social 
Science Quarterly 54 (1973/74): 700-712. 
4 
priorities of policy-makers.9 Associations between partisan 
activity, socioeconOMic indicators and variations in allocation 
patterns substantiate the relevance of perceiving public policy to 
be the product of the interaction between environmental demands 
and the political idiosyncrasies of governmental institutions. 
This study will analyze the distribution of quantities of 
public recreational facilities in Chicago with the intent of revea-
ling who benefits and who bears the costs; how are distributive 
patterns in a significant number of wards related to measures of 
partisan strength, race and ethnicity and to what extent is the 
policy of the Chicago Park District, as it may be manifested in 
that relationship, efficient and equitable. Relevant past studies 
have relied too heavily on anecdotal inferences related to the 
eccentricities of partisan politics in Chicago.10 Other 
empirically oriented studies have failed to adequately address the 
effects of administrative peculiarities that characterize service 
delivery environments. 
In particular, Mladenka's investigation of the distribution of 
recreational facilities in Chicago is fundamentally flawed. It is 
theoretically founded on a dubious proposition. Namely, that 
9David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Pol~t1Qal Life 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965). 
10see Len O'Connor, C1out: Mayor Daley and His City (Chicago: 
Regency Press, 1975). Also see Milton Rakove, Don't Make No Wayes, 
Don't Back No Losers (Bloomington: University of Indiana, 1975). 
5 
progressive reforms and the rise of urban service bureaucracies 
have, in effect, rendered urban partisan machine organizations 
inoperable and inconsequential. To those acquainted with the 
political nuances of the Chicago governmental system, that 
assertion is thoroughly unacceptable. Mladenka failed to con-
trol for the concentration of a large percentage of public 
recreational facilities in a small number of wards containing 
major lakefront attractions. The inclusion of those outlying cases 
produced misleading findings and led Mlade~~a to endorse a number 
of implausible generalizations. Mladenka's major conclusion, that 
politics has no effect on the allocation of quantities of public 
recreational facilities in Chicago, appears to be a methodological 
artifact; the result of a flawed technique which neglects to 
consider an essential peculiarity of the service environment. 
Therefore, this study intends to contribute to a critical body of 
research which presumes that service distribution patterns reflect 
the underlying priorities of those institutions and officials 
responsible for the distribution and administration of services. 
The efficacy of that intention rests specifically on a research 
design which corrects the methodological errors of that portion 
of Mladenka's earlier study devoted to the distribution of public 
recreational facilities in Chicago.11 
11see Kenneth Mladenka, "The Urban Bureaucracy and the 
Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to 
Politival Control," American Political Science Review 74 
(1980): 991-998. 
6 
Given the diversity of urban settings and the variety of 
services delivered by municipal governments, a number of observations 
regarding the rationale of distributive policy have been offered. 
Those observations have led to the development of three major hypo-
theses concerning the distribution of services by municipalities.12 
The underclass hypothesis relates patterns of distribution 
to the dispersal of social classes. Since the process of 
urbanization involves the clustering of racial, ethnic and social 
classes into distinct areas, the distribution of services 
inevitably benefits some groups of citizens while depriving 
other groups of citizens.13 Nivola suggests that equity is 
feasible only where a high degree of homogeneity exists: In hetero-
geneous urban areas, the maldistribution of services is a predic-
14 table outcome of urban settlement patterns. 
Jones and Kaufman describe the distinctiveness of urban 
neighborhoods and suggest that distributive patterns reveal the 
priorities and attitudes of policy-makers and administrators. 
12For a general discussion of the major hypotheses, 
consult Harlan Hahn and Charles Levine, Introduction to Urban 
Politics: Past. Present and Future (New York: Longman Inc., 1980). 
Also Robert L. Lineberry, Equality and Urban Poliqy (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1978). Also Bryan D. Jones and Clifford 
Kaufman, "The 'Distribution of Urban Public Services: A Preliminary 
Model," Administration and Society 6 (1974): 337-360. 
13Robert L. Lineberry, "Equality, Public Policy and Public 
Services: The Underclass Hypothesis and the Limits to Equality," 
Politics and Policy 4 (1975): 67-84. 
14Pietro s. Nivola, "Distributing A Hunicipal Service: A Case 
Study of Housing Inspection," Journal of Politics 40 no.1-2 (1978): 
59-81. 
(They note that) ••• urban governments have the opportunity to 
distribute their services such that some kinds of citizens 
enjoy more of the benefits of government activities than do 
other kinds of citizens ••• by distributing services unequally 
to neighborhoods, governments are distributing those services 
unequally to categories of citizens.15 
7 
The discriminatory attitudes that pervade society regularly influence 
distributive decisions and service deprivation occurs deliberately. 
and systematically. Support for that view is primarily drawn from 
legal suits instituted b.Y citizens seeking a more equitable 
distribution of services. 
In a 1969 editorial, the New York University Law Review 
asserted the need for active judicial intervention in the area 
of municipal service provision. It stated: 
The need is long overdue for judicial recognition of a legal 
right to adequate municipal services. Remedies must be madg 
available against abuse of discretion by public officials.1 
Consequently, an increasing number of urban residents sought to 
redress apparent service inequities through the courts; to demon-
strate that Maldistributions of services constituted violations of 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
15aryan Jones and Clifford Kaufman, "The Distribution of 
Urban Public Services: A Preliminary Model," ,Administration_ 
and Society 6 (1974): 337. 
16
"The Right to Adequate Municipal Services," New York Univer:-
sity Law Review 44 (1969): 774. Also see Kenneth W. Bond, "Toward 
Equal Delivery of Municipal Services in the Central Cities," Fordham 
Urban Law Journal 4 (Winter 1976): 263-287. Robert L. Lineberry, 
"Mandating Urban Equality: The Distribution of Municipal Public Ser-
vices," Texas Law R~vi~ 53 (Dec 1974): 26-59. A.E Merget and W.M 
Wolff Jr., ''The Law and Municipal Services: Implementing Equity," 
PubJ ic Mana~emen..t 58 {1976): 2-8. R.L Graham and J .H Kravitt, "The 
Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services and 
Wealth," Harvard Law Review 7 (1972): 103-213. 
8 
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides 
for the implementation of equitable remedies where the effect of 
state and local action has been to discriminate invidiously 
against an identifiable class of persons deprived of a guaranteed 
right or important benefit generally enjoyed by society at large~? 
Various groups of citizens in a number of cities utilized the equal 
protection clause to seek a more equitable allocation of services. 
In Hawkins v Shaw (1971), a Court of Appeals ruled that the 
paving of streets and dispersal of sewers in Shaw, Mississippi 
followed a racially discriminatory pattern; black neighborhoods were 
deprived of services regularly accorded to white areas.18 
In Hadnott v City of Prattville, the Court declared: 
••• a municipality may not discriminate in the delivery of services 
to black neighborhoods without acting in violation of the equal 
protection clause, whether the discrimination was intentional or 
merely the result of an arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness ••• 
once discrimination in delivery based on race if demonstrated, 
the court will employ the strict scrutiny test. 9 
In both cases, the municipalities were ordered to remedy the 
effects of discriminatory distributive decisions. 
However, in San Antonio School District v Rodriguez, 411 U.S 
1 (1973), the United States Supreme Court ruled unfavorably towards 
the unqualified application of equal protection to the delivery of 
services. The court refused to identify education as a fundamental 
right and further asserted that apparent inequities could be 
justified by certain compelling arguements (e.g fiscal dilemmas). 
17Bond, "Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services," 263. 
1 ~awkins v Shaw 437 F2d. 1286 (1971). 
19Bond, "Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services," 270. 
9 
The Court also unequivocally stated that the maldistribution of ser-
vices was a legislative and not a nudicial concern. 
In view of that ruling, legal challenges to municipal 
distribution policies declined and subsequent cases were rarely 
adjudicated in favor of dissatisfied underclasses. In Goldstein v 
City of Chicago, a district court judge declared that "refuse 
collection was one of the numerous social welfare benefits which 
governmental units have voluntarily undertaken to provide, but 
was certainly not a fundamental right.1120 In Towns v Beame, a 
district court was not persuaded by evidence alleging racial dis-
crimination in fire protection services; the court found no vio-
lation of equal protection because New York's policy of closing 
certain facilities was justified by the need to reduce services 
in response to a budgetary crisis.21 
For those inclined to a pluralist orientation to community 
power (Robert Dahl), discriminatory distribution patterns are 
implicit to a pluralistic system. Active and efficiently organized 
groups procure a sufficient allocation of services, while those 
groups unable to adequately articulate their interests are 
20Goldstein v City of Chicago 504 F2d. 989 (7th Cir. 1974) 
991. Similar judgements were rendered in Beal v Lindsay 468 F2d. 
287, 292 (2nd Cir. 1972). Also Davis v Weir 497 F2d. 139 (5th Cir. 
1974). Also Burner v Washington 389 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C 1975). And 
Fine v City of Winner 352 F.Supp. 925 (D.S.D 1972). For a general 
discussion of the effect of San Antonio v Rodriguez, consult Martin 
A. Schwartz, "Municipal Services Litigation After Rodriguez," 
Brooklvn Law Review 40 (1974): 93-114. 
21Towns v Beame 386 F.Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y 1974). 
10 
deprived of needed services.22 Various groups do not benefit 
equally in terms of service outputs and outcomes, not because of 
deliberately discriminatory policies, but, rather, because certain 
ethnic and socioeconomic traits confer organizational and, therefore, 
political advantages within a service delivery network. A number 
of authors have asserted that the capacity to organize collectively 
is related to ethnic political culture. If distributive decisions 
reflect patterns of group activism, one would expect that 
allocation patterns favor those ethnic clusters more disposed 
to political participation and collective organization. 23 Dale C. 
Nelson found large differences in levels of participant culture 
existing among ethnic groups, with a particularly strong correlation 
between Irish ethnic identity and political involvement. 24 
Similarly, Terry Clark observed that the Irish are more inclined to 
personalize politics and have more resources of significance for 
engaging in politics than other groups.25 
22see Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in 
an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). 
23see Werner z. Hirsch, "The Supply Side of Urban Public 
Services," in Issues in Utban Economics, eds. Harvey s. Perloff and 
Lowdon Wingo Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp.447-526. 
Also Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic 
Identification," American Political Science Review 11 (1967):717-726. 
24nale c. Nelson, "Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as 
Sources of Participation: The Case for Ethnic Political Culture," 
American Political Science Review 73 pt.2 (1979): 1024-1038. 
25Terry Nichols Clark, "The Irish Ethic and the Spirit of 
Patronage," Etbpicity 2 (1975): 305-359). 
11 
A number of groups may also cooperate to secure certain 
services. Rich suggests that: "The more community organizations 
representative of an area, and the more powerful those groups are, 
the better and more efficient will be the services provided for that 
26 
area. Citizen demands shape distributive policy, as their 
neighborhood spokesmen influence the policy choices of officials 
and bureaucrats. Service distribution patterns are related to 
patterns of collective neighborhood organization. Rich asserts: 
It is important to study the access of different groups to the 
decision processes involved in service distribution ••• the 
effectiveness of neighborhood associations in mobilizing the 
technical expertise neccessary to interact with municipal 
officials.27 
••• community efforts may condition public service delivery 
patterns as bureaucrats are attracted to areas in which they 
receive greater cooperation or see more fruits from their 
labors, or as they direct resources away from neighborhoods 
8 that help themselves and reduce their need for outside help.2 
Inequities in services among distinct groups, then, are seen as the 
implicit outgrowth of pluralism, rather than the result of 
intentional discrimination by those who formulate distributive 
policy and administer services. 
For the elitists (Floyd Hunter), the existence of a dis-
advantaged underclass deprived of needed services substantiates 
the predominance of wealthy elites in city government. Those who 
hold political power, namely economic notables, will distribute 
26Jones and Kaufman, "The Distribution of Public Services," 340. 
27Richard C. Rich, "Neglected Issues," 1.50. 
28Ibid, 151. 
12 
services in a manner approximating patterns of socioeconomic 
affluence. Although the affluent possess greater individual 
resources and can more easily acquire privately supplied services, 
the allocation of public services will tend to favor the wealthy.29 
They would argue that "normally demands from neighborhoods are 
unlikely to play an important part of the process; they are 
usually sporadically generated and difficult to fit into the daily 
routine of service provision."30 
The structural hypothesis posits a relationship between the 
organization of partisan political strength and the distribution of 
supporters. Allocations of services will reflect the attitudes and 
priorities advocated by predominant party organizations as they 
consolidate support and political power. Unlike the underclass 
hypothesis, which focuses on discrimination of a sociological nature, 
relating the distribution of services to racial bias, ethnic 
pluralism, or class consciousness, the structural hypothesis 
emphasizes the inequities that result from political favoritism, 
as officials of the predominant party find it expedient to dis-
tribute services preferentially to party supporters. In considering 
the distribution of services, it is crucial to compare the services 
rendered to broad aggregates of partisan loyalists with the 
29see F1.oyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of 
Decision !'-fakers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1954). 
3°Bryan D. Jones, "Distributional Considerations in Models 
of Government Service Provision," in The Politics and Economics of 
Urban Services, ed. Robert L. Lineberry (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1978), 38. 
13 
services rendered to a broad category o~ non-supporters. The 
structural hypothesis suggests that variances in services will 
approximate varying levels o~ categorical support ~or the dominant 
political party. There is a critical distinction between the 
distributive policies that characterize older unre~ormed govern-
mental structures and more recent re~ormed formats that have 
progressively sought to diminish the in~luence o~ party organiza-
tions. Presumably, then, where older ~orms o~ MUnicipal government 
persist, the aggregate structure of partisan political strength 
is an especially relevant consideration. 
Traditional machine organizations consolidated partisan sup-
port by dispensing patronage and pre~erentially servicing an 
ethnic constituency. I1achines developed simultaneous with 
urbanization and immigration, as local party o~~icials capitalized 
on the opportunity to secure a mass base o~ electoral support; 
ethnic groups which desired needed services, but who were ~amiliar 
with the contours o~ the political system, caMe to rely on their 
informal contacts with party representatives. Thus, Ban~ield and 
Wilson describe the machine as an agency ~or allocating tangible 
incentives to an ethnic constituency through a centralized partisan 
31 
organization. As Cornwell states: 
Ethnicity is essential to the machine. Any disciplined grass 
roots political organization rests upon a docile mass base 
31Edward Ban~ield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
which has in some manner been rendered dependable, predictable 
and manipulable.32 
Hence, in unreformed cities where machine organizations may have 
14 
predominated, the distribution of services might be expected to re-
fleet varying levels of categorical partisan strength. 
However, there is a paucity of empirical studies dealing 
with the structural hypothesis. Kasperson analyzed voting patterns 
in Chicago's mayoral elections of 1951, 1955 and 1959, dividing the 
city into concentric zones of Democratic strength. The core area 
of greatest electoral support was characterized by a concentration 
of poor black and ethnic groups. Kasperson suggested that: 
Here greater value is placed on neighborhood needs, material 
gifts and favors and family and ethnic ties ••• politicians 
capitalized on the poverty stricken and more transient 
population of this area to erect a political machine with 
its accompanying corruption.33 
While the inference is that levels of services will be higher in 
those inner zones of support as a matter of political expedience, no 
empirical assdciation between patterns of service distribution and 
varying levels of electoral support were demonstrated. 
Oliver Williams has described urban policy as "the use of 
space to structure social access," thereby noting the importance of 
varying life style values among different classes of citizens. 
Where more non-essential services, like recreation, are at issue 
or in cases where services are significantly related to the 
32Elmer E. Cornwell Jr. , "Bosses, Machines and Ethnic Groups," 
in T,De City Boss in America: An Interpretive Reader, ed. Alexander 
B. Callow Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 124. 
33Roger E. Kasperson, "Toward A Geography of Urban Poli-tics: 
Chicago, A Case Study," Economic Geo£:raphy 41 (1965): 103. 
maintenance of certain life styles, service disparities may be 
preferable.34 Since life styles and demands vary in a hetero-
geneous setting, the underclass hypothesis may be an insufficient 
means of generally appraising the service distribution policies 
of municipal governments. 
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Furthermore, studies to date have not revealed any consistent 
pattern of discrimination in the distribution of services. In their 
study of the distribution of parks and libraries in Houston, 
~Uadenka and Hill showed distributional inequities to be dispersed 
rather than cumulative; park acreage and facilities were allocated 
equally, while locational patterns selectively favored low income 
areas. The distribution of library resources favored upper income 
neighborhoods, while the spatial distribution of libraries favored 
black and low income neighborhoods.35 There also appears to be no 
evidence that the more affluent influence policy officials to 
manipulate the distribution of services in a manner detrimental to 
an underclass.36 Nor do policy officials consistently serve the 
needs of the underclass to the detriment of the more affluent.37 
340liver Williams, Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social 
Access Approacb (New York: The Free Press, 1971). 
3%enneth Mladenka and Kim Quaile Hill, "The Distribution 
of Benefits in an Urban Environment: Parks and Libraries in Houston," 
Urban Affairs Quarter1y~3 (1977-78): 73-82. 
36see Rich, "Neglected Issues." 
37 See G. Antunes and W. Plumlee, "The Distribution of an 
Urban Public Service: Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status and Bureau-
cracy as Determinants of the Quality of Neighborhood Streets," 
Urban Affairs Quarterly 12 (1976-77): 313-332. · 
16 
Nor are there any studies indicating cumulative inequalities on the 
basis of ethnicity. In short, the trend is one of sporadic inequities 
in some service functions, but not in others.38 
Based on those observations, and in view of the professiona-
lization of municipal government, a number of scholars have asserted 
the efficacy of a bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis. Progressive 
reforms of the electoral process and administrative innovations have 
eroded the effectiveness of party ~chines in urban areas. In 
the majority of American cities, professional managers and special 
service bureaucracies have been installed to impartially allocate 
and oversee service distribution.39 If inequities occur, they 
are seen as a function of varying life style preferences or as the 
result of spillovers from rule based decisions designed to resolve 
other problems.40 Neither partisan leaders, nor economic notables, 
exert an overbearing control of municipal policy, especially 
where administrative goals supercede political ambition in 
refo~ed settings.41 
38see Lineberry, The Politics and Economics of Urban Services. 
39see Mladenka and Antunes, "The Politics of Local Services 
and Service Distribution," in The New Urban Politics, eds. Louis 
Masotti and R.L Lineberry (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 
1976), pp. 37-69. 
40
see Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy. 
41 see Demetrios Caraley, City Government and Urban Problems 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977). 
The bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis is advanced in a 
number of studies. Nivola analyzed Boston's housing inspection 
program in 1973 and concluded that service patterns were dictated 
more by the internal imperatives of the administrative process 
than by the dynamics of local politics.42 Mladenka analyzed the 
distribution of parks, fire protection, refuse collection and 
educational facilities in Chicago, correlating service outputs 
with electoral results and socioeconomic indicators: Finding only 
minimal associations among the variables, he concluded that distri-
butive patterns were primarily a function of bureaucratic inter-
agency procedures.43 In a study of police protection in Houston, 
~Uadenka and Hill attributed the pattern of service responses to 
the police department's rule of dispatching aid on the basis 
44 
of the seriousness of reported crimes in progress. Jones, 
Greenberg, Kaufman and Drew examined the service outputs of 
Detroit's Environmental Protection Agency, Sanitation Department 
and Parks and Recreation Department: In each instance, they found 
that service distribution was best explained by the internal 
structure of each agency and standard rule based productivity 
42see Nivola, "Distributing A }funicipal Service: A Case 
Study of Housing Inspection." 
43see Mladenka, "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago 
l-1achine." 
~enneth Mladenka and Kim Quaile Hill, "The Distribution 




considerations.45 Typically, those endorsing the bureaucratic 
decision-rule hypothesis conclude: 
••• recent research reveals that the distributional decisions in 
large cities are made by professional administrators who rely upon 
technical rather than political criteria to guide distributional 
choices ••• resource allocation is little effected by electoral 
outcomes, income levels or the racial makeup of neighborhoods.46 
Whatever hypothesis one subscribes to, there must be a greater 
awareness of the limitations of service distribution research. 
Conclusions drawn from limited studies cannot be unequivocally 
endorsed in a doctrinnaire fashion. In a dynamic urban setting: 
Service decisions are the product of the urban policy-making 
process. That process occurs within a structure composed 
broadly of urban elites, elected officials, interest gro~s 
and the delivery bureaucracies of municipal governments. ~ 
In addition, a heirarchy of services may exist; certain services 
may involve greater expenditures, or be appraised as more valuable 
by influential leaders and client groups than other "softer" 
services. Hence, different hypotheses may be applicable to 
different services within the same system. "The particular pattern 
of service distribution observed seems to depend on the service 
studied and the service indicator employed. n 48 
45Jones, Greenberg, Kaufman and Drew, "Service Delivery 
Rules and the Distribution of Local Government Services: Three 
Detroit Bureaucracies," Journal of Politics 40 no.1-2 
(1978): 332-368. 
46madenka, "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago 
Machine," 991. 
47Lineberry, Eguality and Urban Policy, p. 17. 
48Jones et. al. Service Delivery Rules and the Distribution 
of Local Government Services," 339. 
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One should also be cognizant of a number of methodological 
issues: Municipal records may be unavailable, obscure or unreliable. 
The choice of variables used to measure underlying concepts and 
operationalize hypotheses may be inadequate. The distinction 
between quantitative ann qualitative dimensions of service 
delivery constrains hypothetical judgements. How are services 
best measured? In terms of quantities of facilities and personnel, 
the promptness and frequency of service, the nature of the 
personnel-client relationship, or service consumption.49 
Clearly, the most critical factor in analyzing patterns of 
service allocation and distributive policy is a recognition of 
environmental and political transition. The Chicago school of 
sociology emphasized the need to be sensitive to "ecological 
succession;" the replacement of one neighborhood population or land 
use by another.50 Changes in the composition of neighborhoods 
produce dynamic variations in patterns of life style values, 
the or~anization of community interests and the emergence of 
client based needs. Meanwhile, political leadership often changes 
substantially. GivE"n the mobility of the urban population, 
distributive decisions targeted to serve the needs of particular 
categories of citizens may be rendered inconsequential, especially 
where services are delivered through fixed facilities. There 
49see Lineberry, The Politics and Economics of Urban Services. 
5°see Howard Aldrich, "Ecological Succession in Racially 
Changing Neighborhoods: A Review of the Literature," Urban 
Affairs Qyarterly 10 (1974-75): 327-348. 
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is a need, then, to utilize time series analysis and variables 
sensitive to the realities of transition, methods which have 
been overlooked in past research endeavors. 
Finally, one is faced with the issue of interpretation and 
evaluation. In evaluating patterns of distribution, the literature 
tends to proMote standards of equity and responsiveness. Given the 
reality of ecological succession and urban heterogeneity, one Must 
distinguish equality of outputs from equitable outcoMes; "The 
provision of equal_ service outputs to groups of consUMers who are 
in highly unequa1 circumstances may produce inequitable outcornes.u51 
Policy tradeoffs are an inherent feature of a fiscally strained 
system and disparities in the services given to citizens may actually 
reflect progressive innovations in policy, as specific areas are 
targeted for special experimental programs. Consequently, evaluating 
the public policy of a specialized service agency involves estab-
lishing permissible ranges of variance from equity based on an aware-
ness of the disruptive effects of ecological succession, fiscal 
strain and varying life style demands, as well as the constraints 
intrinsic to bureaucratic procedural rules and administrative 
prereouisites. With those considerations in mind, the following 
research project will reveal the pattern of distribution of 
public recreational facilities in Chicago and assess the public 
policy of the Chicago Park District. 
51Rich, "Neglected Issues in the Study of Urban 
Service Distributions," 154. 
CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In view of the fiscal problems being encountered by local 
governments, the Illinois state legislature, in April 1934, passed a 
Park Consolidation Act which combined twenty-two separate park 
districts in Chicago into a single district. Whereas recreational 
services had previously been financed by variable local tax levies, 
the Consolidation Act enabled the district to finance bonds and 
support programs through a uniform tax levy on real estate in 
Chicago. Under its charter, 
••• the Park District has power to levy taxes and make special 
assessments; it may issue bonds, which must be approved by the 
voters in a referendum, It may enact and enforce ordinances, 
rules and regulations for the maintenance and protection 
of property under its jurisdiction~ and it may acquire land 
by gift, purchase or condemnation.'2 
A non-salaried board of five co~issioners appointed by the mayor 
assumes general responsibility for policy, and a general superin-
tendent is empowered to oversee the day to day operations of ten 
major departments. Since 1934, the Chicago Park District has 
extended its jurisdiction, so that it currently maintains over 580 
parks (7,340 acres), in addition to nine major museums, Lincoln 
Park Zoo, numerous harbor facilities and Soldier's Field,53 
52Chicago, The Key to Our Local GovernMent, prepared by 
the League of Women Voters, 1978, p. 86. 
53Chicago Park District: Records and Estimates Division-
Planning Group, Table of Parks and Park Facilities, 1980. 
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This research project is designed to analyze the distribution 
of recreational facilities in Chicago; to explain variances in the 
dispersal of public recreational facilities in terms of patterns of 
partisan strength, racial and ethnic diversity and socioeconomic 
affluence. Theoretically, the issue is one of determining the rela-
tive explanatory power of several competing theses in regards to 
the allocation of recreational facilities in Chicago. The under-
class hypothesis posits the existence of a disadvantaged clientele, 
deprived of needed or desired services because of deliberate discri-
mination, the realities of a pluralistic (competitive) system, or 
influence of class conscious elites. Those who favor a structural 
hypothesis assert that distributive policy is an extension of 
partisan politics, as a broad coalition of loyalists and supporters 
receive greater benefits. In view of the professionalization of 
city government and progressive reform of electoral procedures and 
hiring practices, a number of scholars endorse a bureaucratic 
decision-rule hypothesis; patterns of distribution are a function 
of bureaucratic interagency procedures. Methodologically, the 
primary consideration is the need to develop measures and procedures 
sensitive to the reality of political change and urban mobility. 
Therefore, this study attempts to answer a number of inter-
related inquiries: l)How is the distribution of public recreational 
facilities in Chicago related to racial differences, ethnic 
pluralism and levels of affluence (tests the underclass hypothesis)? 
2)How is the distribution of public recreational facilities in 
Chicago related to partisan politics (tests the structural hypo-
thesis)? 3)If there is no significant relationship between the 
distribution of facilities and those aforementioned indicators, 
is the bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis applicable? 4)Does 
the relative explanatory power of each independent factor (race, 
ethnicity, affluence, partisan strength, bureaucratic procedures) 
in regards to the distribution of quantities of facilities persist 
or change substantially over timeZ 5)Finally, in view of those 
findings, how efficient and equitable is the public policy of 
the Chicago Park District? 
The data neccessary to the exploration of those questions 
was readily available. Although access to data of a more quali-
tative nature (personnel records, financial statements, employee 
performance) is restricted, the Chicago Park District's Division 
of Records annually compiles a detailed public disclosure of 
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numbers of parks and park facilities and their location. Measure-
ments of partisan political strength can be adapted from election 
statistics maintained by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. 
Racial, ethnic and socioeconomic profiles can be obtained from 
Census Reports. 
Since Chicago is a ward based political system, with census 
figures broken down accordingly, aggregate ward profiles appeared 
to be an appropriate unit of analysis: The majority of aldermen 
have direct contact with a sizable number of their constituents, 
and the coincidence of the location of wards with comparatively 
homogenous ethnic and socioeconomic clusters reinforces the use 
of aggregate ward statistics. 
Similarly, numbers of park facilities could be easily 
tabulated by ward. However, of the 7,340 acres devoted to the 
provision of public recreational services, 2,720 acres, or 
nearly 34 percent of property maintained by the Chicago Park 
District is devoted to major lakefront attractions (Burnham Park, 
Grant Park, Jackson Park, Lincoln Park, Navy Pier and Northerly 
Island).54 These major parks are designed and preserved as a 
civic obligation, in order to promote the general attractiveness 
of the lakefront area. As such, those services are not targeted 
24 
to the demands or needs of any specific constituency. Furthermore, 
such a large concentration of facilities in a limited area and 
limited number of outlying wards would frustrate any empirical 
attempt to explore the discretionary dimensions of recreational 
policy. The functional distinction between the maintenance of 
major lakefront attractions, as opposed to the delivery of 
recreational services to distinct groups of citizens clustered 
elsewhere, warrants the need to reduce the number of cases. 
Accordingly, those ten wards containing major lakefront attractions 
(Wards 1, 2, 4, 5, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49) are eliMinated in 
order to insure a sample of cases conducive to investigating the 
substantive theoretical questions of service distribution research. 
54Chicago Park District: Records and Estimates Division-
Planning Group, Table of Parks and Park Facilities. 1966. 
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Thus, this research project will attempt to explain variances in the 
distribution of recreational facilities across 40 wards in terms of 
varying levels of racial, ethnic and socioeconomic diversity and 
partisan support. (See Illustrations/Figure 1-1, 1-2, pp. 26, 27) 
After calculating the number of Park District facilities 
in each ward, several facilities were selected to serve as the 
dependent variables. Football and soccer facilities are fairly 
representative of a group of outdoor facilities (See Appendix A,p.76). 
Because certain qualitative indicators proved to be unavailable, 
it was incumbent to select facilities whose locational distribution 
might involve some qualitative fiscal dimension. Fieldhouses and 
recreation buildings represent an extensive capital investment 
and are more highly prized by local interests and were naturally 
included in the analysis. Finally, a measure of all total 
facilities per ward was also included. (Profiles of the Park 
District facilities contained in each ward can be found in 
Tables 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4, pp. 28-31.) 
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Is the distribution of recreational facilities related to 
patterns of racial dispersion, ethnic competition, or 
class consciousness? (tests of the underclass hypothesis) 
If the intentional version of the underclass hypothesis is 
applicable, one would expect patterns of distribution to reflect 
deliberate discrimination against racial minorities. A number 
of prominent Black spokesmen in Chicago, especially Reverend Jesse 
Jackson and Alderman Clifford Kelly have alleged that services 
are distributed in a racially discriminatory manner. As recently 
as 1981, the Chicago Sun Times asserted that: 
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Chicago Park District Commissioners traditionally have performed 
like trained seals,barking on cue from their dictatorial keeper, 
Supt. Edmund L. Kelly •• This enabled Kelly to run the parks like 
his own private plantation, showering money on the ones in white 
neighborhoods, while those in minority areas deteriorated.55 
Activists speaking for minorities have regularly charged that areas 
containing white majorities receive both more and better services. 
The Black voter registration drive and the emergence of Hispanic 
activists is illustrative of an increasing disaffection with 
service outputs and distributive policy among minority groups in 
Chicago.56 Inequities in distribution patterns are attributed to 
intentionally discriminatory policies and inadequate minority 
representation in policy-making institutions. Thus, drawing on 
information supplied in the 1960 and 1970 Census Reports, this 
study includes measures of percent Black Cxt and x5) and percent 
5~'The Park District Board Wakes Up," Chicago Sun Times 
(Jan. 30, 1981), p. 33. 
56Jorge Casuso and Cisco Garcia, "In Clout City, Hispanics 
Are Hungry for Power," Chicago Sun Times (Oct.27, 1981); 4, 32~ 
Hispanic (Puerto Rican + Me:xican/x4 and xs) per ward. 
The pluralistic version of the underclass hypothesis 
attributes service inequities to the competition between groups 
implicit to a democratic system. Consequently, those groups whose 
cultural traits dispose them to actively participate in politics 
and actively strive to acquire the benefits incidental to distri-
butive policy receive larger preferments of services. While 
Chicago is distinguished by a large Polish population, the Irish 
are portrayed as the most politically active of a number of 
ethnic groups. Kraus discloses that, in 1969, Irish politicians 
held eleven of the top sixteen offices in Chicago and Cook 
County, with administrative control of more than 72,000 jobs.57 
JJ 
Again, this study utilizes the information provided in the 1960 and 
1970 Census Reports to develop measures that sQ~arize the degree 
of Polish and Irish ethnicity per ward; calculated as the number of 
Polish and Irish foreign stock/total ward population in 1960 and 
1970. (percent Irish foreign stock=x2 and X6• percent Polish 
foreign stock=x3 and X?) 
The elitist version of the underclass hypothesis proposes 
that the more affluent are likely to possess political influence 
and power, and are predisposed (class consciousness) to effect a 
distribution of services skewed toward more affluent areas. One 
indicator of affluence is the quality of housing, so that 
57Peter R. Kraus, Chicago: A One Party State 
(Champaign,Ill: Stysis Publishing Co., 1972). 
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affluence per ward (x34) is measured as the proportion of 
dilapidated and deteriorated housing within a ward (the lower the 
number, the greater the affluence). Median income is another viable 
measure of affluence (x35) (the greater the median income, the 
greater the affluence), and this study utilizes both measures 
to assess the efficacy of the elitist approach. 
If deliberate discrimination in the distribution of 
recreational services occurs, one would expect to find clear 
winners and losers among racial aggregations. Negative correlations 
(numbers of facilities decline as indicators of race increase) be-
tween quantities of facilities per ward and percentages of Black 
or Hispanic residents per ward would tend to suggest intentionally 
discriminatory distributive policies. Positive correlations 
(facilities increase as indicators of ethnicity increase) between 
quantities of facilities and greater percentages of those ethnic 
groups more likely to participate in politics (the Irish) would 
tend to affirm the pluralist version of the underclass hypothesis. 
If greater quantities of services are rendered to affluent areas, 
an elitist interpretation of the underclass hypothesis would be 
suggested. 
(Racial and ethnic ward profiles can be found in Tables 2-5 
and 2-6, pp. 35, 36. Profiles of ward affluence are listed in 
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~e&SUreMent Of af~ Uence 
19~C=x~u (pcrcrnt of 
dilapi~ated ar.d d~terio­
rated housir.~ units) 
•the lower t~t P'"!"centa~~. 




~~asurenent of affluence 
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a!'nuence · 
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Abstract,1970 . 
Is the distribution of numbers of recreational facilities 
related to the organization of partisan political strength? 
(tests of the structural hypothesis) 
The structural hypothesis assumes that the evaluation of 
service distribution patterns cannot be considered apart from 
the idiosyncrasies of partisan politics. That is, an informal 
structure of party loyalties and political expedients dictate 
the manner in which services are allocated and administered. 
Thus, it is essential to consider the eccentricities of partisan 
politics in Chicago if one seeks to explain variances in the 
distribution of public recreational facilities. 
Like most older American cities, Chicago has a mayor-
council form of government, with the mayor theoretically sub-
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servient to the City Council. In practice, however, power has been 
centralized in the Democratic party, with the office of the 
mayor the focal point of a partisan machine type organization. 
Chicago aldermen are elected from wards containing roughly 60,000 
to 80,000 residents. Large increases in population and pressing 
fiscal problems have mandated the institution of a plethora of 
agencies and special districts to deal with the administration 
of city services. 
The Denocratic machine in Chicago, like machines in other 
large cities, developed as local politicians capitalized on the 
immigration of large numbers of ethnics (unfamiliar with the 
nuances of the political system) to create a constituent base of 
electoral support, while also regularly dispensing patronage 
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to secure party discipline and loyalty. 
The first genuine citywide machine to amalgamate all ethnic. 
groups and wards into a single organization was built by Anton 
Cermak in 1931. After Cermak's assassination in 1933, the Demo-
cratic machine was consolidated by Ed Kelly and Pat Nash during 
the 1930s and 1940s and was refurbished and58xpanded under four 
term mayor Richard Daley from 1953 to 1976. 
The distribution of patronage was crucial to t.l;.e growth of the 
machine; workers were hired and promoted on the basis of partisan 
loyalty. In turn, they delivered services in a personalized fashion 
to a politically unsophisticated constituency, those who readily 
came to vote on the basis of personable impressions of their 
exchanges with party workers. KiJ.ian, fletcher and Ciccone assert 
that almost one of every ten city workers are precinct captains, 
responsible for providing services and favors and producing votes.59 
The most revealing information about Chicago's patronage system is 
found in depositions to the Shakman suit against the Democratic 
organization of Cook County.60 The Cook County Democratic Central 
Committee and the City of Chicago admitted to giving preference in 
hiring to those applicants sponsored by Democratic ward committeemen 
and other officials. The city also admitted to the practice of 
requiring applicants hired in that manner to do precinct level 
58see Kraus, Chicago: A One Party State. 
59Michael Kilian, Connie Fletcher and F. Richard Ciccone, 
Wbo Runs Cbicaio7 (New York: St. }~rtins Press, 1979). 
60}fichael M. Shakman and Paul M. Lurie et. al. v the Demo-
cratic Organization of Cook County et.al. Case no. 69 C 2145 in U.S 
District Court, Deposition by William R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel 
and Attorney for the Defendant City of Chicago. 
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political work. 61 
Meanwhile, a handful of powerful Democratic aldermen, 
working in tandem with the mayor, control the City Council when 
key issues are considered. This is accomplished by controlling 
committee assignments, especially those of the Finance Committee. 
Since ward committeemen determine who will be slated on the 
party's ticket in the ward, and appoint and dismiss precinct captains, 
it is incumbent on elective officials to follow the dictates of 
the party.62 
In retrospect, the machine has exhibited an enduring 
capacity to win elections, despite the emergence of independent 
factions and contenders and the decline of immigration and 
continuing assimilation of ethnics. That ability is attributable 
to the consistent support of a long-standing electoral coalition. 
Those supporters live in the oldest third of Chicago (the river 
wards); an area inhabited by lower income workingmen and Blacks, 
who have an almost genetic affinity for the Democratic party. 
Although they represent only a third of Chicago's voters, their 
strong support of Democratic candidates offsets the machine's 
customary losses in more competitive zones of the city.63 
61Dick Simpson, "Chicago Politics and Government," in Illinois: 
Political Processes and Governmental Performanc~, pp.2J6-250 ed. 
Edgar G. Crane Jr. (Dubuque,Iowa: Kendall-Hunt Publishing Co., 1980). 
62see Kasperson, "Toward A Geography of Urban Politics." 
6JRalph Whitehead Jr., "The Organization Han," in.Contemporary 
Readings in American Government, pp. 101-107 eds. Byron W. Daynes and 
Raymond Tatalovich (Lexington, Mass: D.C Heath and Co., 1980)~ 
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Throughout its history, the Park District is said to have 
maintained a working relationship with the Chicago Democratic 
machine. Critics immediately refer to its mayoral appointed board, 
a unique arrangement in that the trustees of all other Illinois 
park districts are elected. The general superintendent has also 
often been a major functionary of the Democratic party, and many 
view his office as a political instrumentality; to distribute the 
estimated 3,000 patronage jobs available in the District. Kilian, 
Fletcher and Ciccone imply that Ed Kelly, then a 47th ward 
committeeman, was appointed general superintendent of the Park 
District by Mayor Daley because he recognized that the position 
would enable Kelly to wrest control of the ward from the 
64 Republican party. 
In Political Influence, Edward Banfield discusses the role 
of the Park District in the political maneuvering surrounding 
the 1950s Exhibition Hall Project.65 Tribune official Robert L. 
}fcCormack provided the rationale of the original proposal; the Hall 
was seen as a means of attracting trade shows and conventions. 
A professional engineer commissioned to survey proposed sites 
suggested the use of a 180 acre tract of land owned by the Park 
District. When the estimated cost superceded existing funds, 
two bills were introduced in the state legislature; one to 
64xilian et. al., Who Runs Chicago?. 
6~ward c. Banfield, Political Influence 
{New York: The Free Press, 1961). 
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create a Metropolitan Fair and Exhibition Authority as a municipal 
corporation empowered to issue revenue bonds, and another bill 
authorizrng the Park District to lease the proposed 180 acre Burnham 
Park site. Both bills passed and the Authority applied for a lease 
of the site in 1956. The commissioners approved the lease and 
the Park District conducted public hearings regarding the project. 
Fred Kramer, the President of the z.retropolitan Housing and Flanning 
Council, voiced objections to the encroachment on recreational 
space reserved for crowded sections of the city. In his testimony 
before the board, he stated: "We do not believe the Park District 
would intentionally subordinate the recreational needs of the 
people to the interests of certain groups."66 Various citizens 
committees also expressed their disapproval, but the mayor, the 
newspapers and the Park District board supported the project. It 
was approved, but a number of legal suits were initiated in an 
attempt to enjoin the Park District from leasing the proposed 
tract. They were summarily dismissed by the lllinois Supreme 
Court and the Hall was constructed. Banfield suggests that: 
"it seems clear that there is a tension between the nature of 
the political system and the requireMents of comprehensive 
planning and consistent policy. "67 
66Ibid, p. 20). 
67 Ibid, p. 324. 
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More recently, the nature of Park District concession 
contracts were scrutinized: A Chicago Tribune article disclosed an 
arrangement by which a politically connected food vending firm 
held a no-bid concession contract with the Park District for more 
than 35 years. The firm, Cafe Brauer, owned by Michael T. Skrak 
and Paul J. Hecker, a regular contributor to the Cook County 
Democratic party, was given an exclusive contract to sell food, 
beverages and confections at public parks and beaches north of the 
Chicago River. Although other firms attempted to bid on the con-
tracts, the arrangement with Cafe Brauer was perfunctorily renewed 
every three to five years. Another firm, Consolidated Concessions 
Inc., headed by William J. Burns, an administrative assistant 
to Cook County Board President George Dunne, held a similar contract 
to sell food and beverages at Soldier's Field and parks south 
of the Chicago River for more than 30 years.68 
In Chicago, the distribution of services is regularly 
seen in the context of partisan favoritism. Although recreational 
services represent a softer, less essential, service, the preceding 
disclosures suggest that it would be inappropriate to view the 
distribution of recreational facilities in a manner which de-
emphasizes the partisan political context. Consequently, this study 
includes indicators of partisan strength per ward. Since the 
mayoral election is the focus of partisan politics, measures 
68
william Crawford and Ronald Koziol, "Non-Bid Park Food Pact 
Bared," Chicago Tribune ¥..ar.9, 1978 (Newsbank 22: B3). Also Crawford 
and Koziol,"Vending Pact to Dunne Aide," Mar.10,1978 (Newsbank 22:B4). 
of partisan strength are adapted from mayoral election returns. 
Because the strength of the ~achine is usually evaluated in 
terms of its capacity to generate a sizable turnout of disciplined 
party supporters, Democratic strength per ward (x1J' ~8· x23• X28) 
is calculated as the difference between the number of applications 
for ballots and the margin of victory for the Democratic mayoral 
candidate in the general election (the lower the difference, the 
greater the strength). A positive correlation (facilities increase 
as Democratic strength increases) between the distribution of 
quantities of recreational facilities and levels of De~ocratic 
strength would tend to suggest the validity of the structural 
hypothesis. (Profiles of Democratic strength per ward are 
provided in Tables 2-8, 2-9, 2-10 and 2-11, pp. 45-48) 
TABLE 2-8 
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SCNJ"Ce: Adapted fJoo!ll Board ot Election COI!t'1issioMra or the City of Chica~o, 
Chicago HeiP,bta and Be!'VJ'ft, Canyasdne Sheet tor tht Mayoralty. Judicial 
and SupPlel'lentan Aldemanic !bctions, AprU 1963. 
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_Source• Ada¢td frOI'I Board of !lection Comisaionera of the City of Chicaco, 
Chicago Be113bt• and Be"'7ft, Canvusing Sh!tt for t.be Ml,yoralfa, Jvd1c'•l 
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If there is no significant relationship between the 
distribution of numbers of facilities and those 
factors, is a bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis valid? 
In view of the progressive reform of city government and 
the growth of independent special districts, others assert that it 
is preferable to analyze service allocation apart from the context 
of partisan politics. Any service inequities are viewed as the 
result of interagency priorities, as bureaucracies attempt to 
balance fiscal imperatives with varying life style demands, 
especially in the case of the distribution of softer services. 
Whereas those endorsin~ a structural hypothesis point to 
the essential importance of partisan politics to explain distri-
butive choices, a bureaucratic interpretation rests on the assumption 
of the erosion of party influence or the capacity of partisan 
organizations to centralize control and induce party discipline. 
In terms of Chicago politics, one need only refer to the effects 
of the Shakman decree on the political uses of patronage: 
Shakman, a political independent, filed the case as a class 
action, claiming the constitutional rights of all voters were 
infringed by patronage hiring •• Judge Nicholas Bua eventually 
declared that patronage hiring was illegal and in a recent 
series of related actions, Y~yor Byrne was rebuked for trying 
to fire several dozen city workers for political reasons.09 
Furthermore, a number of commentators have observed that: 
••• the party has lost its reputation for delivering victories 
for the top candidate it endorses. Mayor Bilandic, Senator 
Kennedy and Alderman Edward Burke were all endorsed by the 
organization, but lost •• and Mayor Byrne has failed to demonstrate 
69Brian J. Kelly, "Shakman Case Slowly Changes Way City 
Runs," Cbicaio Sun Times (Aug.22, 1982), p. 50. 
the type of control over the court system and other county 
offices that Mayor Daley had.70 
An increasing number of independent candidates have been elected 
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and Don Rose, a prominent campaign consultant, re~arks: "This is an 
historic tide that won't be reversed. The Shakman federal court 
decision, the increasing independence of voters and television are 
among factors that ruin chances for the return of a monolith.n71 
In addition, the recent factionalization of the machine 
coincides with several reforms within the Park District. The Park 
District was named as a defendant institution in the Shakman suit 
and concession contracts were opened to public bidding in 1978. 
The power of the general superintendent was reduced while the 
Park District board was entrusted with the authority to improvise 
five major committees to oversee parks administration in concert 
with various public committees. Given those developments, it 
may be appropriate to attribute the distribution of public 
recreational facilities to impartial bureaucratic decision-rules.72 
By utilizing multiple regression and standardized regression 
coefficients (beta), the relative influence of partisan, racial, 
ethnic and socioeconomic factors on the distribution of quantities 
of selected recreational facilities among 4o wards can be explored. 
70Basil Talbot Jr., "The Machine is Gone-Now there are 
Machines," Cbicaio Sun Times (Dec.20, 1981) Sec. 2, p. 1, 4. 
71 4 Ibid, p. • 
72see Dolores McCahill, "Park District Board Creates 5 
Policy Committees," Chicago Sun Times (Apr.15, 1981), 12. 
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The ability to accurately measure the relative explanatory 
power of a group of independent variables using multiple regression 
rests on certain assumptions. The most prominent prerequisite is 
that the independent variables are not highly collinear; the 
explanatory power of predictive variables is valid only in cases 
where each may have some degree of unique effect. Where high 
multicollinearity among independent predictors exists, the effort 
to measure uniquely explained variance is eroded. Given the 
interrelationships among the major hypotheses that purport to 
explain variances in service distribution patterns, one might 
expect independent variables which are indicative of those 
hypotheses to be somewhat interrelated. This study is characterized 
by a number of intercorrelated independent variables. (Table 2-12) 
TABLE 2-12 
1 2 3 4 .5 6 7 
1 .Democratic Strength 1963 1.0 
2.Democratic Strength 1967 
-9.5 1.0 ).Affluence 1960 -.!lj -~ 1.0 
4.Percent Black 1960 .70 • .57 -.69 1.0 
.5.Percent Irish 1960 -.32 -.24 .4.5 -.3.5 1.0 
6.Percent Polish 1960 -.31 -.22 .23 -.62 -.2.5 1.0 
?.Percent Hispanic 1960 .46 • .53 -.49 .07 -.33 .21 1.0 
1 2 3 4 .5 6 7 
!.Democratic Strength 1971 1.0 
2.Democratic Strength 197.5 .87 1.0 
) • .Affluence 1970 -.82 -.72 1.0 
4.Percent Black 1970 .64 .61 -.64 1.0 
.5.Percent Irish 1970 -.46 -.42 .64 - • .52 1.0 
6.Percent Polish 1970 -.27 -.39 -3.5 -.78 .13 1.0 
7 .Percent Hispanic 1970 .41 .2.5 -.29 -.31 -.29 .38 1.0 
Figures listed=simple correlations between pairs of 
independent variables 
Democratic strength per ward is strongly related to percent Black 
per ward (the greater the number of Black residents in a ward, the 
greater the support for the DeJ!locra tic party in that ward) • 'lhus, 
it may be difficult to discover the unique effect of race versus 
partisanship on the distribution of facilities. Similarly, there 
are significant correlations between levels of affluence and 
percent Black (the greater the number of Black residents in a 
ward, the less affluent the ward). Thus, it may be difficult 
to assess the unique effect of race versus affluence in regards 
to the distribution of facilities. 
Although there are no statistical procedures that entirely 
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solve problems of collinearity, a number of alternative methods have 
been devised to minimize its confounding effects. One alternative 
is to increase the size of the sample in order to increase the 
likelihood of achieving statistically significant results. However, 
in this study, the reduced number of cases, 40 wards, is set by 
the need to control for the disruptive effect implicit in the 
concentration of major facilities in wards containing lakefront 
parks and attractions. Another possibility is to co.rnbine the 
intercorrelated variables into a single indicative measure.73 
However, sinee each offending variable is individually significant 
in terms of the competing hypotheses, that option is theoretically 
unacceptable. Finally, one may discard the offending variables 
in a manner that maintains the major theoretical basis of the study. 
73see Michael s. Lewis-Beck, A~~lied Regression: An !ntro-
ductign (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980). 
Because the issue of the unique influence on distributive 
policy attributable to race versus partisanship is especially 
intriguing, those variables are not combined. Rather, since 
affluence bears such a strong relationship to race, the indicator 
of affluence is discarded. When that independent variable is 
discarded, the correlations among the remaining independent 
variables are as follows: (See Table 2-13, p. 54) 
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TA.B!S 2~13 
MATRIX OF Th'DE:PENDENT VJ.P.IASU:S 
Democratic Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Strength 1963 Black 1960 Irish 1960 Polish 1960 Hispanic 1960 
Democratic Strength 63 1.0 
Percent Black 1960 .10 1.0 
TIME I 
Percent Irish 1960 -.32 -.)5 1.0 
Percent Polish 1960 -.)1 -.62 -.2.5 1.0 
Percent Hispanic 1960 .46 .(1? -.)3 .21 1.0 
DeMocratic Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Strength 1967 Black 1960 Irish 196o Polish 1960 Hispanic 1960 
De~~~oera tic Strength 67 1.0 
Percent Black 1960 . .~ 1.0 'l'IME II 
Percent Irish 1960 -.24 •• .,.s- 1.0 
Percent Polish 1960 
-·'22 -.62 -.2.5 1.0 
Percent Hispanic 1960 .J)_ .rt? -.)) .21 1.0 
Democratic Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Strength 1971 Black 1970 Irish 1970 Polish 1970 Hispanic 1970 
D~ocratic Strength 71 1.0 
Percent Black 1970 .65 1.0 TIME lli 
Percent Irish 1970 -.46 -.52 1.0 
Percent Polish 1970 -.27 -.78 .1) 1.0 
Percent ~ispanic 1970 .41 -.)1 -.29 .)8 ,1.0 
Denocratic Percent Fercent Percent Percent 
Strength 1975 Black 1970 Irish 1970 Polish 1970 Hispanic 1970 
Dtm~ocratic Strength 75 1.0 
Percent Black 1970 .61 1.0 
Percent Irish 1970 -.42 
-.52 1.0 
Percent Polish 1970 
-.)9 -.78 .1) 1.0 
Percent ~ispanic 1970 
.2.5 -.)1 -.29 .)8 1.0 
•Figures listed•silotple r/si:raple correlation between variables 
, 
Does the relative effect of the independent variables 
(partisan strength, race, ethnicity) in regards to the 
distribution of recreational facilities persist over time? 
Aside from methodological concerns, there is also a sub-
stantial need to assess the relationship among the variables (the 
relative explanatory power of the different hypotheses) over time, 
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especially in view of the dynamic and transitional nature of Chicago 
politics and society. Therefore, this study assesses the variance 
in the distribution of quantities of recreational facilities among 
the 40 wards over a 20 year time period, roughly 1960 to 1980. 
Since recreational services are delivered through fixed facilities, 
it may happen that facilities targeted to serve the needs and 
demands of a specific clientele might miss their mark. For that 
reason, hypothetical pronouncements concerning the distribution 
of services at a specific time are always suspect, since any apparent 
patterns may have occured spuriously, as populations move from 
area to area and inherit previously affixed facilities. In short, 
the reality of ecological succession, or the mobility of the urban 
population, warrants the need to analyze patterns of distribution over 
time, in a manner sensitive to the nature of the urban environment. 
Unfortunately, the use of change variables is precluded by the 
redistricting of wards (reapportionment), which prevents comparisons 
of facilities per ward over extended periods of time. However, if 
one employs consistent methodological procedures, it is possible 
to compare the relative influence of independent predictors in 
separate time periods. In essence, will a relationship which 
characterizes an earlier tirne period continue in successive time 
periods, despite transitions in leadership personnel and demographic 
changes, or will distributive policy be altered substantially in 
light of those developments. Time series analysis, in effect, 
allows for the recognition of results that are attributable to 
unpredictable shifts in population, thereby assuring a less 
tenuous evaluation of distributive policy. This study proceeds as: 
Selected facilities per ward for 1966-football and soccer 
fields(y1), fieldhouses(y2), recreation buildings(y3) and total 
facilities(y4) are each regressed with a number of independent 
variables-percent Black 1960(x1), percent Irish foreign stock 
1960(~), percent Polish foreign stock 1960(x3), percent gispanic 
1960(x4) and Democratic strength 1963(x13)-per ward. (TIME I) 
Selected facilities per ward for 1970-football and soccer 
fields(y5), fieldhouses(y6), recreation buildings(y7 ) and total 
facilities(ys) are each regressed with a number of independent 
variables-percent Black 1960(x1), percent Irish foreign stock 
1960(~), percent Polish foreign stock 1960(x3), percent Hispanic 
1960(x4) and Democratic strength 1967(xt8)-per ward. (TIME II) 
Selected facilities per ward for 1976-football and soccer 
fields(y9), fieldhouses(y10), recreation buildings(y11 ) and total 
facilities(y12) are each regressed with a number of independent 
variables-percent Black 1970(x5), percent Irish foreign stock 
1970(x6 ), percent Polish foreign stock 1970(x7), percent Hispanic 
1970(x8) and Democratic strength 1971(~3)-per ward. (TIME III) 
Selected facilities per ward for 1980-football and soccer 
fields{y13), fieldhouses{y14), recreation buildings{y15) and total 
facilities{y16) are each regressed with a number of independent 
variables-percent Black 1970(x5), percent Irish foreign stock 
1970(x6), percent Polish foreign stock 1970(X?)• percent Hispanic 
1970(x8) and Democratic strength 1975(xz8)-per ward. (TIME IV) 
CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
When quantities of selected park district facilities per ward 
are regressed with a number of independent variables per ward across 




Slll.ECTED FACn.ru-...s HIT!-! .U.L D.'D£PEND£NT 
VARIA.Bl.ES ACROSS FOUR TIY.i FEiUODS 
he'tdhou .. a 1966 vith: 'b.ta (dgn1f1cance: Total FacU1t1 .. 1966 vith: beta (dg.) 
-.72 (.01) 
T~ II 
Phldhou .. • 1970 vit.h: beta (aign1t1eance: Total Faci11t1u 1970 vit.h: beta (a1g.) 
Percent Black 196o 
-.68 (.05) D•oorat1c Strength 196? -.sa (.01) 
Percent lr1ah 196o -.41 (.05) Percent Polish -.48 c.os> 
Tlr.t III 
fieldhou•u 1976 vith: beta (aign1t1cance) Toul Fae111ti•• 1976 vithz beta (dg.) 
Percent Black 1970 
-.87 (.0,5) Pareent Hi1panlc 1970 -.6o (.05) 
Percent lri1h 1970 
- • .50 (.0,5) 
TD'l': IV 
Toul FacU1t1es 19Ro vith: beta (a1gn1t1cance) 
Percent Black 1970 -.98 (.05) 
Percent Ritpan1c 1970 -.68 (.01) 




In TIME I and TIME II, the distribution of fieldhouses per 
ward is most significantly influenced by Democratic strength per 
ward. One can reasonably predict that the greater the level of 
Democratic strength in a ward, the less will be the number of 
fieldhouses (beta = -.61). Also, the greater the level of Democratic 
strength in a ward, the less the number of total facilities (beta= 
-.72). Because Black wards strongly support the Democratic party 
(intercorrelation=.?O), the distribution of greater numbers of 
facilities to wards in which Democratic strength is less has 
the effect of disadvantaging Black wards; or white wards which do 
not support the Democratic party as strongly as Black wards will 
likely receive greater quantities of fieldhouses and total facilities. 
In TIME III and TD1E Dl, the distribution of quanti ties of 
total faci 1_i ties is negatively related to percent Black and per-
cent Hispanic per ward; the greater the percentage of Blacks or 
Hispanics in a ward, the less the number of total facilities (betas= 
-.60 Hispanic, -.98 Black). 
The structural hypothesis is clearly inapplicable in regards 
to the allocation of quantities of facilities. Although Blacks 
offer strong support for the Democratic candidate, Black wards 
receive less faci1_ities than less supportive wards. Given the 
collinearity between percent Black and Democratic strength, is 
that pattern of distribution related to a policy of directing 
quantities of services to non-supporters, or is that pattern a 
function of a policy which favors white wards to the detriment of 
Black wards, with race the primary consideration? 
There are two possible approaches to the problem of 
appraising the unique variance attributable to race versus parti-
sanship. The unique variance accounted for by each variable can 
be calculated by comparing the differences in R Squared; or the 
proportion of variance explained by the independent variables 
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for a regression including all independent variables versus 
regressions eliMinating one of the collinear variables. (Table 3-3,62) 
In T]}m I and TIME II, the proportion of total variance in 
the number of total facilities per ward explained uniquely by 
Democratic strength is greater than the amount of variance uniquely 
explained by percent Black. However, since only a small number 
of wards contained substantial percentages of Blacks, with those 
wards characterized by extremely strong Democratic support, the 
distribution of cases diminishes the significance of any statement 
regarding the independent effects of race versus partisanship. 
In TIMES III and IV, the Black population is more dispersed, 
as greater percentages of Blacks came to reside in wards where 
Democratic support is less pronounced and which had previously 
benefitted from greater preferments of fixed facilities. Presuming 
increased numbers of Blacks have come to live in wards previously 
characterized by white majorities, the unique variance attributable 
to race should decline (if apparent inequities were merely a 
spurious occurence) as Blacks inherit greater numbers of 
previously affixed facilities (in previously less supportive wards). 
However, the unique variance explained by race increases from .02 
to .10 between Tl}ffi I and TIME IV. (See Table 3-3, p.62) 
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Although the increase is slight, one would expect that unique 
variance attributable to race would decline as the Black population 
became more dispersed and greater percentages of Blacks inherited 
greater quantities of facilities previously affixed in less 
supportive wards. Because the factor of race increased in 
importance in relationship to the distribution of facilities, one 
can assert that race is apparently more influential than 
partisanship when distributive policy is at issue. 
TMI 
TABLE 3-3 
VARIATION IF. 'l'!m DISTRIBtT!'ION OF QUANTITIES OF 
1'0tAL l'ACniTD:S mliQOELY EIPIJ.D.'ED BY DEl'lOCRA'!'IC 
S'l'R!:NGTH(PARTISANSHIP) VS PmCENT BLACK (RACE) 
Total Facilities 1966 with All IJ!dependent Variables R SQTJA.1lE=.49 (.01 significance) 
Total Facilities 1966 with AU IJ!dependent Variables 
Except De~~~ocratic Strength 1963 R SQUARE=.32 (.01 aignif'icance) 
Total Facilities 1966 with All IJ!dependent Val"iables 
Except Percent Black 1960 R SQUARE=.47 (.01 significance) 
Unique ~riance explained b,y DeMocratic strength(part1aanship)=.17 
Unique ~riance explained by Percent Black (:race)•.02 
TIME n 
Total Facilities 1970 with All Independent Variables R SQUARE=.41 (.01 significance) 
Total Faci,.ities 1970 with All Independent Variables 
Except DertoCl"Atic Strength 1967 R SQUARE=.27 (.05 ai~ifieance) 
Total Facilities 1970 with All IJ!dependent Variables 
Except Perc.nt Black 1960 R SQUARE=.36 (.01 significance) 
Unique variance explained b,y DeMocratic strength(partisanship)=.14 
Unique variance explained b,y Perc.nt Black (race)=.05 
'I'~ III 
Total Facilities 1976 with All Independent Variables R SQOARE=.33 (.05 significanc~) 
Total Facilities 1976 with All Indepement Variables 
Except DeMocratic Strength 1971 R SQUARF.=.33 (.01 si~ifieance) 
Total Facilities 1976 with All Inr!ependent Variables 
Except Percent Black 1970 R SQUARE=.26 (.05 sir,nificance) 
Unique variance explained b,y Democratic strength(partisanship)=.OO 
Unique variance explained b,y Percent Black (race)•.07 
TIME IV 
Total Facilities 1Q~ with All Independent Variables R SQOA1lE=.35 (.01 significance) 
'l'otal Facilities 19~0 with An Independent Variables 
except Dtt!'locratic Strength 1971 R SQ1li.RE=.34 (.01 significance) 
Total Facilities 1980 with All Independent Variables 
except Percent Black 1970 R SQOARE=.25 (.OS ai~ifioance) 
Unique ~riance explained b,y Dertocratic st~n~(partisanship)=.01 
Unique ~riance explained b,y Percent En.ack (race)=.10 
*Only statbtics achieving at least a .05 level of significance are reported 
63 
A second option is to control for strong Black support of the 
Democratic party by excluding those wards in Which Black support for 
the Democratic party is greatest. Although reducing the number of 
cases may decrease the likelihood of obtaining significant statistic~ 
the removal of those outlying cases creates a sample of wards in 
which the relationship between percent Black per ward and 
Democratic strength per ward is less pronounced. Collinearity 
is reduced and a more accurate appraisal of the independent 
influence of race versus partisanship is possible. However, 
because there is only a minimal number of wards containing substan-
tial numbers of Blacks in T]}m I and TIME II, controlling for the 
effects of strong Black support is impractical in those times. 
(See Table 3-4, p.64) In TIMES III and IV, the greater dispersal 
of Blacks (more wards contain substantial numbers of Blacks) 
enhances the use of such controls; the exclusion of extremely 
supportive Black wards does not dilute the representativeness of 
the sample in regards to racial distribution (12 wards containing 
substantial numbers of Blacks remain). When that control procedure 
was applied , the correlation between race (percent Black) and 
partisanship (Democratic strength) is reduced to .48 in TIME III 
and .52 in TIME IV (See Table 3-5, p. 65) The distribution of 
facilities in those time periods among 34 wards is characterized 
by racial discrimination, as both Black and Hispanic wards receive 
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Mll'RIX OF DmEPENO~T VARD.BL!S RF;-:OVDl~ ~OS?: SIX OR SEV::N Wk.tiDS CCNT.A.D'D:~ 
BLACK MlJORITES .lND lElCH .lRE J.!OST SUPPOR~IVE OF THE DD·!OC:U.TIC PA..~TY (4 TD:ES) 
Dtl!lloeratie Percent Percent Percent F""!"Cent 
Strength 196) Black 196o Irish 196o Polish 1960 Biapanic 1960 
D-'locratic Strength 196) 1.0 
Percent Black 1960 .lq 1.0 
Pe!"Cent Irish 1960 ... 20 ... 2S 1.0 
Percent Polish 1960 .2S .oo ... 62 1.0 
Percent Biapanic 196o .61 .,a 
-.36 .4S 1.0 
Dera.ocra tie Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Strength 1967 Black 196o Irish 1960 Poli1h 1960 Hispanic 1960 
Daocntic Strtrngth 1967 1.0 
Percent Black 196o .42 1.0 
Percent Irish 1960 ... u ... zs 1.0 
Fercent Pol1ah 1<}60 .23 .oo ... 62 1.0 
Percent Hilpanic 1960 .61 .,s 
-.36 .45 1.0 
D11111ocratic Percent Percent Percent Percent 
St:r'engt.h 1971 Black 1970 Irish 1970 Polish 1970 P.ispanic 1970 
De~~~ocratic Stren~h 1971 1.0 
Pel'cent Black 1970 .48 1.0 
Pel'cent Irlah 1970 
-.36 ... 18 1.0 
Pe:r"cent Poliah 1970 .oo ... so ... ~ 1.0 
Percent Hispanic 1970 .?0 .09 - • .58 .20 1.0 
Democratic Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Strength 197 S Black 1970 Iri•h 1970 Polish 1970 Hispanic 1970 
Denocntic Strength 1975 1.0 
Percent Black 1970 .sz 1.0 
Percent Irl•h 1970 
-.23 ... 1e 1.0 
Percent Polish 1970 
-406 
-.so -.36 1.0 
Percent Hi1panic 1970 
-.sz .09 -.~ .20 1.0 




SELECTED FACILITIES WITH ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AMONG WARDS IN WHICH BLACK SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY IS LESS PRONOUNCED 
TIME I 
!'ota.l Facilities 1966 vith1 beta (significance) 
D~ocratic Strength 1963 
-.64 (.01) 
mtE II 
'l'ota.l Facilities 1970 with: beta (significance) 




Total Facilities 1976 with: beta (significance) 
Percent Hispanic 1970 
-.80 (.01) 
TIME IV 
Total. Facil.i ties 1980 vi th: beta (significance) 
Percent Hispanic 1970 
-.16 (.01) 
Perc~t Black 1970 
-.16 (.OS) 
*Only statistics achieving at least a 
.05 level of significance are given 
66 
67 
Before any conclusions are presented, it is essential to 
reiterate the parameters of this study: This project is restricted 
to an analysis of the distributive patterns that typify the delivery 
of a single service, recreation, within a single city, by a single 
agency, the Chicago Park District. The parameters of the study 
suggest that the results cannot be unilaterally applied to the 
distribution of other services, nor can they explain distributive 
patterns in other unique environments (in other cities). One must 
consciously avoid the overgeneralizations which characterize past • 
service distribution research. However, in regards to the 
distribution of public recreational facilities in Chicago and the 
public policy of the Chicago Park District, a number of assertions 
can be specified. 
Among 40 wards in the City of Chicago, it is apparent that: 
l)Black wards receive less quantities of total facilities than white 
wards, despite their strong support for the predominant (Democratic) 
party. 2)The intentional version of the underclass hypothesis 
(deliberate racial discrimination) offers the most valid explanation 
of that pattern of distribution. Although significant numbers of 
Blacks have moved into wards containing greater quantities of 
previously affixed facilities, a negative relationship between 
percent Black per ward and total facilities per ward persists. In 
addition, the variance in the total facilities per ward uniquely 
explained by race has increased over time, despite the increasing 
intensity of Black community groups. 
68 
That conclusion is supplemented by recent legal actions 
instituted against the Park District by the Justice Department. 
A suit, filed by U.S Attorney Dan Webb, charges the Park District 
with extensive acts of discrimination against parks in Black and 
Hispanic inner city neighborhoods. 
A press release from Webb's office said: "The defendants have 
provided and continue to provide fewer recreational facilities, 
instructional programs, recreational personnel and less money 
for capital improvements and building maintenance in predomi-
nantly black and Hispanic communities thall have been provided 
in predominantly white areas of Chicago.? 
Specifically, it seeks a permanent injunction against those 
practices, which violate the provision of the 1974 Housing Act 
prohibiting discriminatory actions by municipal agencies receiving 
federal assistance under the terms of the Act. 
:t-1oreover, there is no indication that the pluraJ.ist version 
of the underclass hypothesis accounts for service discrepancies 
among classes of citizens. Although the Irish are a highly 
involved ethnic culture(politically) and hold significant policy-
making positions in Chicago, there is no indication that wards 
containing greater percentages of Irish foreign stock receive 
greater quantities of facilities (betas= -.41 in TIME II and 
-.50 in TIME III (See Table 3-2, p. 58). 
74William Clements and Maurice Possley, "Park District 
Racial Bias Charged in Suit by U.S," Chicago Sun Times 
1 December 1982, p. ). 
Finally, in view of those findings, Mladenka's assertion 
of the applicability of the bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis 
in regards to the distribution of public recreational facilities 
in Chicago is fundamentally wrong; the product of a flawed 
technique which fails to control for the concentration of 
facilities in major parks alon~ the lakefront. 
· ... ; 
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APPDIDIX A MATRIX OF DEPDIDENT VARIABLES 
FACD..ITIES 1980 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 R 9 10 11 12 1J 14 15 16 17 18 18 20 21 22 2J 24 
SFlliOR BASEBALL FIELDS 1 1.0 
. JtlN IOR 'R.& ~li'R& T T FIELDS 2 .119 ·1.0 
In ~Li. STANDARDS 1 • ')1 .55 11.0 
I nl YC'.l.MPS la. .Y? 
-
.4ft 1.0 
[.L & SOCCER FIJ>S "i .')6 .68 .63 .'Jl 11.0 
ROll!'lli'.sHO!i: COURTS 6 .16 .25 .09 .JJ .JO 11.0 
PT.A: _7 ~78 .16 .45 
-
.4J .17 1.0 
; SHUFFL 'BOARD COURTS R .11 .10 .z4 .17 olZ ~09 ~zo 1.0 
SKATING AREAS 9 .20 .62 .IH> .59 .54 .42 .11 .OJ 11.0 
SOFTBA T T FIElDS 10 .'34 .zo .JM .z4 .LRS .J5 .05 .JO - 1.0 
'I'F.NN;[S COURTS 11 44 ,47 ,')1 ,Lt4 .61 .10 .2"i .11 
·' 2 .61 1.0 YOLLEYBALL COURTS 12 .29 .70 .52 .58 .51 .26 .09 .36 .65 .22 .')4 1.0 
l'ASSIVE REC.AREAS 1J .rn .24 .10 .2J .3J .14 .oR ·.1? -~ .14 .15 .OJ 1.0 CLUB RO<Jm 14 .27 .52 .40 .71 .61 .64 .:n -~ ._to .16 .47 ,')2 .20 1.0 SWIMMD!G POOLS ~-i .a!! '!Ofl 14 •oR 10 1!11 17 ~15 .01 *1'3 .!22 1!26 .o4 ~OA 1.0 ART CENT~ .2R .'YI .37 .65 .4"i .47 .oo .17 .48 .26 .4"i .12 U6 1.0 
AWITORIUMS 1i ~ .47 .47 .56 .4J ,.16 _.21 ._ffl .'fl 40 .44 .12 .63 114 1.0 
CRA['l'R~S 18 §~l !-~~ 194 .48 .JO ._51!_ .01 *11 .29 .11 .22 .03 .29 .62 .05 .6J .40 1.0 DRAMA CENTERS 19 .24 .21 .27 .27 .27 .02 .23 .15 .27 .35 .20 '!11~ .4) t14 .sJ .~ .51 1.0 
FIELDHOUSES 20 :u .25 .25 .46 .29 .47 .26 '101 .so .10 .24 .10 .29 .72 .12 .62 
-
.'Il - 1.0 
GYMNASIUMS 21 .52 .48 .52 ,4R .47 .20 .16 .16 .11 .30 .31 .28 •uo - .28 .Y/ .6J .)0 .J) ._Lt4 1.0 
M~~~Tils- ··------ -~2 .23 !.51 .)1 .56 .4) .35 .14 .15 .48 ,24 .)6 .Y/ .2) .77 ~l.f>_ .79 .61 .60 .52 ..§2 .41 1.0 ~30 ~ :-zz .22 ~01 - 10~ .oo .07 .29 ,04 'U t .11 .o6 .29 .12 .)1 .46 .o6 .2"i ,21 1.0 RECREATictf BUn.DINGs··-R ·;,s .55 .51 .119 .19 '"';{9 .14 .47 .zo .ZB .7{)_ .09 .)5 .OJ .25 .29 .oo .oo . • rn .Y, .09 -.-~i. 7:o 
• Indicates negative correlations 
APPEliDIX B: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS-ALL DEPENDENT VARIABLES Wlnl 
ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
~!ME I DEMOCRATIC PERCENT PERCENT PERC&NT PJ:Jt\.:ENT 
PA.RK 'FAC:TT.TTTitS 1466 s l'RENG l'H 6 3 BT..ACK60 IRISH 60 POLISH 60 HISP.60 
S~TM -iiic::~QiroTT l'LDS 
-.17 -.12 .10 -.03 -.0£4. 
JON 100 BASEBALL FLDS -.45 -.21 .17 -.07 -.19 
~ASKETBALL S!ANDS -.45 -.35 .20 .ns -.19 
DAYCAMPS -.55 -.27 .24 -.05 -.27 
NMSJO"_c;HOE COURTS -.45 -.20 -.OB -.07 -.08 
PLAYGROUNDS -. ·v~ -.33 .12 -.1 '3 -.1,. 
SHUFFLEBOARD COURTS -.21 -.31 
-
-.oa -.1) 
SKAtiNG AREAS -.69 -.14 .26 .17 -.15 
SOFTBAT.L FIELDS -.51 -. 5lJ. :n -.09 -.18 
!TENNIS COURTS -.29 -.19 .oo -.09 -.05 
VtlT.T.EYBAU. COURTS -. S6 -.~ - .03 -.24 
!PASSIVE REC .AREAS -.30 -.11 .23 -.20 -.26 
CLUBROOMS -.58 -.46 .14 .10 -.17 
S'IJl.rv-!LN(j POOLS .oe 
-
-.14 .18 .26 
ART CENTERS -.55 -.34 .22 -.oo -.09 
:AUDITORIUMS -.3P -.33 .08 .os .01 
CIW'TR.OOMS -.28 -.35 .OB .09 -.13 
DRAMA CENrtRS -.37 -.25 .19 -.02 -.20 




-.49 -.1~ .1~ .01 -.1 f' 


























• • ''J 
TIME II DD10CRATIC PERCENT 'PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AFFLU-
PARK FACILITIES 19?0 STRF>IGTH 67 BLACK60 IRISH60 POLISH 60 HISP.60 ENC~ 60 
SEN-IOR BASE&LL FIELD~ -. ,,.,. 
-.09 .10 -.06 -.04 .20 
JUNIOR BASEBALL FIJ)S -. S2 -.26 .32 -.05 -.25 .)I.J. 
BASKETBALL STANDS 
-
.01 -.o-s- -.08- -.11 .os 
--DAYC.AJoWS -.59 -.'39 .?..? .12 -.24 .h7 
HORSESHOE COURTS 
-.'39 -.34 -.03 .oo -.05 .'30 
PLAYGROUNDS -.30 
-
.01 -.(}9 .01 .21 
SHUFFLEBOARD CRTS -.2? .-15 .os -.08 -.1!~ .17 
SKATING AREAS -.66 -.51 .25 .14 -.21 • 5/J. 
SOFTBALL FIELDS -.42 -.26 .17 -.07 --.16 .L~2 
ITDltJ IS COURTS 
-.'37 -.-zr~ -.oo -.01 -.OL~ .4n 
yc>ttEYBALL COURTS 
-.49 -.28 .25 ·"0 -.n .19 
P.ASSIVE REC.AREAS -.'3'3 -.10 .21 -.18 -.26 .?.lJ. 
·CLUBROOMS -.59 -.~7 .17 .09 -.19 .53 
sw:oo1ING POOLS .26 .21 -.£7 .01 .25 -.'3? 
ART CENTERS -.S2 -.'3'3 .20 
-
-.21 .I.J-2 
~UDITORIUMS -.29 -.25 .11 -.01 .02 .20 
ICRAFTROOMS -.18 -.39 .07 .17 -.16 .31 
DRAMA CENTERS 
-.'31 -.23 .09 -.01 .02 .21 
GYMNASIUMS -.1? -.23 .06 .18 .21 .12 
Kl"'Cl-lEPJS 
-
-.Jo .ro .04 -.18 .42 
IMJSIC CENTERS -.17 .07 .29 -.30 .Ol~ .os 
TIME III DEl-iOCRATIC PERCENT PERCENT t'.l!J{t;&'JT .t' J!Jtlj.l!iN '.1' AFFLU-
PARK FACTI..ITIES 19?6 STRENGTH?! BLACK70 miSH?o POLISH70 HISP.70 ENCE70 
SENIOR BASEBALL FLDS -.02 .05 .09 -.05 -.15 .16 
JUNIOR BASEBALL FLDS -.25 -.14 .18 .08 -.23 .51 
BASKETBALL STANDS -.04 .16 -.16 -.06 -.22 .07 
DAYCAMPS -.4S -.33 - .29 -.34 .65 
HORSESHOE COURTS 
-.33 -.27 .17 .10 -.21 .30 
PLAYGROUNDS .06 -.09 -.12 .01 .14 -.05 
SHUFFLEBOARD COURTS -.11 -.02 .10 -.o-zr -.06 .10 
SKATING AREAS -.57 -.48 .47 • 31 -.24 .74 
SOFTBALL FIELDS -.32 -.08 .31 -.04 -.40 .37 
-·--···-TENNIS COURTS -.46 -.13 .20 .07 -.37 .49 
VOLLEYBALL COURTS -.32 -.31 .37 .19 -.21 .61 
PASSIVE REC.AREAS -.29 -.OR .34 -.TI - .34 
CLUBROOMS -.53 -.so .40 .26 -.30 • 59 
I SW'IM!·!ING POOLS .42 .33 -.-29 -~TJ .13 -._45 
ART CENTERS -.61 -.27 .31 .ro -.53 .62 
AUDITORIUMS -.33 -.35 .24 .21 -.16 .44 
CRAFTROOMS -.24 -.24 .28 .13 -.20 .22 
DRAMA CENTERS -.45 -.20 .13 .11 -.J?. .30 
GYMNASIUMS .02 -.13 -.oo .22 -.02 .07 
KITCHENS -.54 -.41 .30 .2~ -.31 .60 
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SENIOR BASEBALL FLDS 













































PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AFFLU-
IRISH70 POLISH70 HISP.70 ENCE?O 
.09 -.01 -.14 .1? 
.29 .09 -.25 .62 
-.04 -.01 -.25 .2 r; 
.41 .38 -.31 .64 
.15 .28 -.10 .37 
-.08 .oo .10 -.06 
.23 -.07 -.14 .14 
.31 .28 -.10 _J_66 
.13 -.12 -.32 .22 
.17 .07 -.38 .44 
.43 .13 
- 22 .61 
.33 -.10 -.13 
-
.36 .29 -.24 .'56 
-.32 -.09 .20 -.4? 
.31 .25 -.42 .62 




.~6 -.02 -.28 ._27 
.oo .25 .08 .11 
• 36 .zz 
-.29 .59 
.08 
-.05 -.2_5 .1Q 
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